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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PAUL T. MOORE,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 16672

BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE
COMPANY, a corporation,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action seeking damages for personal injuries
sutained while operating a radial arm saw upon defendant's
business premises.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to a jury in July of 1978.

The

jury returned a Special Verdict finding both parties
negligent, but further finding that plaintiff's negligence
was not a proximate cause of his injuries.

The jury awarded

plaintiff $110,000.00 in general damages and $34,892.00 in
special damages.

The lower court entered judgment in
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plaintiff's favor and against d e f en d an t on July 28,
1978 .
Defendant's motion for a newt r1a
· 1 was denied by the lower
court on August 21, 1979.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a reversal of the J'udgment of the lower
court and, an entry of judgment for defendant and against
plaintiff, no cause of action, or in the alternative seeks
to have the matter remanded for a new trial upon all issues,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Shortly before noon on May 1, 1975, the plaintiff and
his associate, Charles Albert (Buddy) Prince, drove to the
business premises of defendant Burton Lumber
Company in plaintiff Moore's pickup truck.

&

[R.

Hardware
643, 672].

Their stated purpose in visiting Burton Lumber was to

~y

some odds-and-ends and to ask permission to use Burton
Lumber's radial arm saw to cut several 2" x 4'"s, the blocks
from which were to be used in finishing work at Foothill
Place;

a Deal Development Company project over which plain·
[R.

tiff served as project foreman.

644, 671-72].

Deal

Development was a customer of Burton Lumber and had an open
account there.

[R. 645).

The account, however, was only

used to purchase minor items.

Deal Development's lumber was

bought from an out of state source and stored at Intermoun·
tain Lumber, several blocks away from defendant's business
premises.

[R.

671).

-2-
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Upon arrival, the two men entered the store.

While

Prince went about gathering the items on their "shopping
list" plaintiff went to the front desk to inquire as to the
possibility of using the radial arm saw.

From this point on

the evidence is in substantial conflict.

Plaintiff claims

that he spoke with Clair Bello, office manager for Burton
Lumber.

[R.

673]. Plaintiff maintains Bello quoted him a

price per cut for the use of the saw.

[R. 673].

The price

seemed high and no set price was ever agreed upon.

[R.

674].

Plaintiff testified that thereafter "someone" told him to
check with the yardmen and if they weren't using the saw that
it was all right for him to go ahead and use it.

[R. 674).

While he remembers speaking with Clair Bello regarding the
price per cut for use of the saw, plaintiff does not remember who instructed him to check with the yardmen.

[R.

783).

Plaintiff's uncorroborated version of the conversation
is substantially different than that recounted by the Burton
Lumber employees.

Testimony for the defendant showed that

when plaintiff first went to the front desk he spoke to
Richard Lindgren, one of the hardware salesmen.

Lindgren

answered "no" to plaintiff's request to use the saw and told
him any cutting would have to be done by the yard people.
Since he did not know what the price would be he referred
Moore to Clair Bello.
sing the price.

[R.

He subsequently heard the two discus830-31].
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Clair Bello testified that while he did
have a conversa·
tion with plaintiff, the substance of it was
with regard to
the price to have the lumber cut, and at no
time was permis·
sion to use the saw even mentioned.
Be 11 o, too, agreed that
no set price was ever established.

[R. 838-39].

The Burton Lumber employees all testified to the fact
that it was a standard recognized policy at the yard that no
one was allowed to use the saw unless he was an authorized
employee of Burton Lumber.

[R.

823, 829-30, 838, 848, 866,

868) •

Following the conversation with Mr. Bello, plaintiff
claims he went out into the yard and spoke with a Mexican
yardman whose name he later learned to be "Jessie".

[R. 6751.

Plaintiff claims the yardman told him that the saw was not
being used and then led him to the, saw shed.

[R. 675).

Plaintiff noticed that the blade of the saw was set for
ripping, whereas he needed it set for cross-cutting.

He

then offered the yardman a six-pack of beer if he would
change the blade before plaintiff got back from Intermountain with the lumber.

[R. 676).

The yardman allegedly

agreed, whereupon plaintiff returned to his truck at about
the same time Buddy Prince came out the west entrance of the
store.

[R. 675-76).

Prince testified to hearing Moore tell

the yardman, "See you after awhile".

-4-

[R. 647).

The two
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men then left the lumber yard through its rear gate which
led onto Main Street.
The Burton Lumber yardmen all controverted plaintiff's
testimony.

According to the testimony of Larry Hester and

Jessie Garcia, plaintiff and Prince came out to the yard
together and, after again being denied permission to use the
saw, repeated plaintiff's version of the conversion at the
front desk to them.

Hester, who no longer works for Burton

Lumber, told plaintiff that he would have to have an invoice
and then the yardmen could do the cutting.

Plaintiff told

the yardmen that he had to go to Intermountain and would
be back in a short time.

Hester told plaintiff that he

would check with the front office during the interim.
Neither Hester nor Garcia remember taking plaintiff to the
saw shed and promising to change the position of the blade.
[R. 847-49, 867-68].
Shortly thereafter, the yard employees, including yard
foreman Vernon Campos who had returned from lunch, heard
the saw running and went down to investigate, arriving at
approximately the same time that Paul Moore came out of the
shed holding his bleeding hand.

[R.

850-51, 869, 919-20].

After their initial conversation with Hester and
Garcia, plaintiff and Prince had driven over to Intermountain Lumber and picked up the 2" x 4"'s they planned to cut
into blocks at Burton Lumber.

[R. 647, 677] ·

The two men
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then drove back to Burton Lumber.

Plaintiff claims they

stopped at a small store on the way where they b ought the
six-pack of beer promised to the yardman.
677-78].

[R. 647-48,

The two entered through the back gate and parked

the pickup truck between the saw shed and an adjacent
building in such a manner that only the end of the truck bed
was visible from any other point in the yard.

[R. 877-78],

Plaintiff then entered the saw shed, measured the
length he wanted to cut the boards, and drove a nail into
the table to use as a gauge.
started up the saw.

[R. 650, 679-81].

He then

Plaintiff claims he did not see the

sign hanging up on the wall opposite the saw which said, in
large yellow letters, "FOR USE OF AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL

ONLY".

[R. 786].

The radial arm saw at Burton Lumber had been in use
on the premises for over thirty years without an accident.
[R. 819].

Plaintiff's expert, Louis Barbe, stated that in

his opinion the saw was "unreasonably dangerous" due to its
lack of blade guards and a kickback guard, which guard would
stop the saw from rolling forward.

[R.621].

Mr.Barbe

admit tea, however, that he had not operated this particular
.

1

saw but had only observed it for approximate Y
one occasion and, a ur ing that time, a id not see
forward any measureable amount.

15 minutes on
th

[R. 602-03 I 631].
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e

saw move
Mr.

Barbe has also had no experience in operating similar
radial arm saws.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, testified as having had
experience operating such saws throughout his construction
background.

[R. 778].

While admitting that such saws are,

by their very nature, extremely dangerous, and realizing the
saw could injure him, plaintiff felt confident to operate
the saw without any instruction or assistance from the lumberyard people in light of his prior experience with this
type of saw.

[R. 761, 779, 788].

While the radial arm saw did lack the guards described
by Mr. Barbe, defendant's expert witness, Dr. Jay Hicken, as
well as all of the Burton Lumber employees, testified that
the upper hood guard attached to the saw could be rotated
down until it almost made contact with any size of stock an
employee might wish to cut.

[R. 854-55, 914, 951].

such, it is an almost impregnable guard.

[R. 952].

As
Plain-

tiff testified that he was aware that the hood would rotate
down, yet apparently chose not to make use of it.

[R. 788] •

Plaintiff had cut one 2" x 4" into 10" to 12" blocks
without incident and had just placed the second 2" x 4"
into position when the accident occurred.

Plaintiff left

the saw running while positioning the next board but claims
he kept his eye on the saw blade while sliding the 2" x 4"
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along the table.

[R. 760).

With his hand directly in the

line of the rotating blade, plaintiff shifted his gaze to
the nail gauge he claims to have nailed in the table, lO" to
12" past the blade.

[R. 762, 792).

While looking at

the gauge, he felt his hand come in contact with the blade,
although he is at a loss to explain how it happened.
In its Instruct ions to the Jury, the lower court failed
to instruct the jurors that there was no duty to warn a
business invitee in the face of an obvious hazard, yet
instructed that there is no duty to warn a licensee in the
face of an obvious hazard.

[R. 325

I

327).

The court also refused to submit either defendant's or
plaintiff's proposed instructions as to the doctrine of
assumption of the risk.

The court's basis for its ruling

was its opinion that assumption of, the risk has been statutorily swallowed up by comparative negligence.

[R. 899].

Over objection, no interrogatory as to assumption of the
risk was included in the Special Verdict.

[R. 1027-28].

Furthermore, the court refused defendant's proposed
instruction that the jury return a verdict finding plaintiff
·
was a proximate cause of
negligent and that sue h neg 1 1gence

plaintiff's injury.

[R. 398, 1028).

Defendant properly objected to each of the court's
rulings and now respectfully submits that the trial court
committed prejudicial error in making such rulings.
-8-
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The jury returned a Special Verdict finding both
plaintiff and defendant negligent.

However, they found

plaintiff's negligence not to have been a cause of the
injury, which conclusion precluded the necessity for comparing one party's negligence against the other.

The jury

awarded plaintiff damages in the amount of $144,892.00 and
the court thereafter entered Judgment.

Defendant's Motion

for a New Trial was denied.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT INSTRUCTING THE
JURY THAT THERE IS NO DUTY TO WARN IN
THE FACE OF AN OBVIOUS DANGER. THE ERROR
WAS COMPOUNDED BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT
UPON ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND IN NOT INCLUDING AN ASSUMPTION OF RISK INTERROGATORY IN THE SPECIAL VERDICT.
From the outset of this litigation, defendant felt that
plaintiff Paul Moore's actions in the face of the open and
obvious danger posed by the unguarded radial arm saw obviated
any duty which defendant owed him.

In accordance with its

belief, defendant presented ample evidence at trial (and was
assisted by plaintiff's own presentation of evidence) to
enable the jury to find either:

( 1) that due to the openness

of the danger a duty to warn or protect plaintiff never arose
thereby uprooting plaintiff's negligence action at its base;
or (2) that plaintiff had voluntarily exposed himself to an
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obvious danger and thereby assumed th e r 1· s k o f in j ury . By
its action, the lower court denied d e f en d ant both theories
of the case.

A.

The c~urt's ~n~truction on the duty owed
a b~s1ness v1s1tor took the question of
obviousness of danger from the jury,
precluding a finding for defendant.

At the close of the evidence, defendant submitted the
following instruction on the duty owed a business invitee:
INSTRUCTION NO. 20
One who extends to a business visitor or
invitee an invitation, express or implied, is
obliged to refrain from acts of negligence and
to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises
in a condition reasonably safe for the business
visitor or invitee in the reasonable pursuit of
a purpose embraced within the invitation.
In the absence of appearance that caution
or would caution a reasonable prudent person in
a like position, to the contrary, the business
visitor or invitee has a right to assume that the
premises and the equipment are reasonably safe for
the purposes for which the invitation was extended
and to act on that assumption.
The responsibility of the lumber yard is n~t
absolute; is not that of an insurer. If there is
danger attending the entry of the premises and the
use of the equipment and if such danger arises
from conditions readily apparent to the senses,
the business visitor or invitee is under a duty to
discover the danger.
The Defendant lumber yard had a right to
assume that Mr. Moore would perceive that which
would be obvious to him upon the ordinary use of
his own sense of sight and was under no duty to

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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give Mr. Moore, if he is found to be a business
visitor or invitee, any notice of an obvious
danger.
[R. 417] •

Although it is a proper statement of the law, the court
refused defendant's proposed instruction and instead subrnitted, verbatim, plaintiff's proposed instruction on the
point:
INSTRUCTION NO. 22
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of his injury, Mr. Moore
was defendant's "business invitee" as that term
is defined hereinafter, then defendant's duty to
Mr. Moore was to refrain from any acts of negligence toward him; to exercise reasonable care to
keep the premises, including the radial arm saw
thereon, in a condition reasonably safe for
purposes consistent with his presence there; and
to warn him of any and all dangers involving the
operation of said saw which were known to the
defendant or should have become known to the
defendant in the exercise of ~easonable diligence
and the performance of reasonable inspections.
[R. 327] .

The issued instruction is seriously deficient in its
statment of the law, as noted in defense counsel's objection
to it.
Well, that is not a complete instruction on
the law. There is no duty to give an instruction
or warning to a man where the danger is obvious
and he should exercise his own common sense to
perceive what the danger is. I think the facts
are here that he should have perceived and, as
such--we should have--the court should have

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-11Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

[R.

instructe~ the jury that there was no duty to be
warning him when they found the hazard was
obvious,
1019, lines 19-26].
Defendant admits that the jury's finding that

was a business invitee at the time of the accident
imposes a much heavier burden on the plaintiff to

plaintiff
[R. 1024]

oversee

plaintiff's safety than if the jury had found Mr. Moore to
be a trespasser or licensee.

But a property owner is not an

insurer for even an invitee.

A property owner's duties

toward invitees are limited to those risks:
Which are unreasonable, Comment f., Restatement
of the Law of Torts, Sec. 342, Gaddis v. Ladies
Literary Club, 4 Utah 2d 121, 388 P.2d 785;
which he has no reason to believe such persons
will discover or realize the risk involved,
Erick son v. Wal green Drug Co. , 1 20 Utah 31 , 232
P.2d 210, 31 A.L.R.2d 177; and which he has reason to anticipate that persons acting with ordinary and reasonable care will encounter. Tempest
v. Richardson, 5 Utah 2d 174, 299 P.2d 124.
Steele v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 16
U. 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751, 753 (1964).

However, one critical

limitation must be added to this statement of the law.
Where the dangerous condition on the premises is readily
observable to the in vi tee, or is as observable to the
in vi tee as to the property owner, the property owner has no
. on 1 y bound by the universal
duty to inspect and warn, b ut is
standard of reasonable care under the existing circumstances.
Steele v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Compar:t•
Ellertson v. Dansie, 576 P.2d 867 (Utah 1978).
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1

The principle that a property owner is under no duty
to warn even a business invitee of an obvious danger is
controlling law in nearly all modern jurisdictions, e.g.
Sherman v. Arno, 94 Ariz. 284, 383 P.2d 741 (1963); Chance
v. Lawry's Inc., 24 Cal.Rptr. 209, 374 P.2d 185 (1962);

CeBuzz, Inc. v. Sneiderman, 171 Colo. 246, 466 P.2d 457
(1970); Folda v. City of Bozeman, 582 P.2d 767 (Mont. 1978);
worth v. Reed, 79 Nev. 351, 384 P.2d 1017 (1963); Romero v.
Kendricks, 390 P.2d 269 (N.M. 1964); Buck v. Del City Apts.,
Inc., 431 P.2d 360 (Okla. 1967); Bluejacket v. Carney,
550 P.2d 494 (Wyo. 1976).

both simple and logical:

The rationale behind the rule is
since the duty of the property

owner is only to warn or protect the invitee from hidden or
unusual dangers, the duty is obviated where the obviousness
of the danger serves as its own warning signal.

Worth v.

Reed, supra; Tolar Construction Co. v. Ellington, 225 S.E.2d
66 (Ct.App.Ga. 1976).

In line with the cited authority, the issue in a case
of this type becomes whether or not the danger was obvious
enough to absolve the landowner of any duty to protect or
warn the invitee.

But that is not the question presented

this appeal.

The issue under consideration is much more

by

limited; namely, whether there was sufficient evidence
adduced at trial to raise the issue in a disputed posture
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and mandate its submission to a J'ury.

If

petent evidence on the issue which raises

h
t ere was coma possible infer-

ence that plaintiff was warned of the danger by its open
nature, then the trial court has an affirmative duty to
submit the theory to a jury and not decide it as a matter of
law.

Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621

(Utah 1977); Powersv.
~

Gene's Building Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977);
Cf. Foster v. Steed, 23 U.2d 148, 459 P.2d 1021 (1969)

(similar holding in a directed verdict context).
The record is replete with testimony which would
substantiate a finding that plaintiff must have been aware
of the danger posed.

1

Plaintiff's only expert, Mr. Louis

C. Barbe, testified that the cause of the accident was the

fact that the circular saw did not have adequate safety
guards.

[R.

620-21).

The fact is the machine was equipped

with a hood guard which could be rotated down so as to cover
the saw blade to the width of the stock being cut.

[R. 820·

21, 854-55, 857, 921).
Plaintiff was not only an experienced carpenter but
was familiar with the operation of the saw.

[R. 778-79,

1

In reviewing the record to determine whether the trial h
'
, d e f en a an t IS theory ftO 'act',
t€
court erred in refusing
to submit
it is important to remember that the evidence.oed.in ·
J'ury
,
and inferences
to be drawn t h ere f rom ar e to be exF arnin
guson v.
the light most favorable to the wronged party.
er_ Jongsma, 10 U.2d 179, 350 P.2d 404 (1960).
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788].

The saw shed contained a large sign which read "FOR

USE OF AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL ONLY."

Plaintiff did not ask

for any instruction from any of the lumberyard employees in
the use of the saw [R. 779] since he felt competent to
operate the equipment.

[R. 788].

Plaintiff knew of the

danger attending the operation of such saws.

[R. 788].

He

was also aware that while the hood guard could be rotated
down, that it had not been.

[R. 788-89].

By his own admission, plaintiff was familiar with
radial circular saws and their operation.

As such he must

also be charged with the knowledge of the relative dangers
posed by a guarded or unguarded saw and, with such knowledge, he is also chargeable with knowledge of the condition
of this saw since its condition was reasonably discoverable
by

a man of his background and experience.

At the very

least, an inference of knowledge can be drawn.
The fact of the matter is that this question, viz.
whether there is credible evidence to warrant the submission of an instruction on this issue to the jury, has
been rendered moot for purposes of this appeal by another
instruction of the trial court.

Instruction No. 20, as

issued by the lower court, clearly shows that the trial
court found that sufficient evidence had been adduced to send
defendant's theory to the jury.

That instruction reads:

-15-
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INSTRUCTION NO. 20
The duty of the Defendant lumber yard to a

l~censee is to not wantonly or wilfully injure the
licensee
and to . warn the licensee of a dange rous
d. .
con : t io~ of which the lumber yard knows and should
reali~e involves unreasonable risk of injury to
t~e licens~e and should also realize the licensee
will not discover or realize the danger.
If the licensee knows or should know of the
dangerous condition of the premises or equipment
there is no duty to warn him of the condition or'
of the equipment or to make the premises and
equipment safe for the use of the licensee.
[R. 325).

The final paragraph of this instruction is a

correct statement of the law and is the same type of
language defendant requested in its proposed instruction on the duty owed a business visitor.

[R.

417].

The instruction clearly illustrates that the trial
court found enough credible evidence on this point to subrnit the issue of obviousness to
licensees.

t~e

jury as it applies to

As set out at length above, a similar limitation

is imposed upon the duty owing an invitee.

Whether the

trial court's failure to include such duty limiting language
in its instruction upon the duty owed an invitee is due to
mere oversight or a mistake of law by the trial court is
unclear on the record.

But the fact that the trial court

instructed the jury on the issue in a licensee context
solidifies defendant's claim that the record justifies
submission and supports defendant's contention that the
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trial court breached its duty to submit defendant's theory
to the jury; whether the failure was oversight or mistake of
law is immaterial.
It is clear that the trial court erred.

But defendant

realizes that the strictures of law do not allow reversal
for mere error or irregularity.
Civil Procedure.
clearly was.

Rule 61, Utah Rules of

The error must be prejudicial.

This error

In accord with the authorities cited infra,

the trial court is under a duty to instruct the jury as to
any theory of a party substantiated by the evidence.

Both

the trial testimony and the trial court's instruction on
the duty owed a licensee show that the burden of evidence
was carried.

The trial court's failure to instruct simi-

larly on the duty owing an invitee then operated to strip
the defendant of a defense which could have possibly barred
any recovery by plaintiff.

The court's action constitutes

fundamental, prejudicial, and therefore reversible error.
Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326 (Ariz. App. 1978); Bradley
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Goodson, 450 P.2d 500 (Okla. 1969);
Wollan v. Lord, 385 P.2d 102 (Mont. 1963); Sherry v. Asing,
531 P.2d 648 (Haw.

1975).

The Utah rule is not contrary.

A refusal to give an

instruction (or portion of one) to which a party is entitled
is reversible error if the effect is to:

-17-

(1) mislead the
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jury to the prejudice of the complaining

t
par y; or

insufficiently advise the jury as to the law.
Ouzounian, 26 U.2d 442, 491 P.2d 1093 (1971).
Rowley v. Graven Brothers

&

(2)

~
See a~

Co., Inc., 26 U.2d 448,

491

P.2d 1209 ( 1971).
This situ at ion is the hand for the rule's glove. Not
only was the jury insufficiently advised as to the full rui
of law, but the fact that the instruction on another status
category contained a proper statement on the law could
seriously mislead the jurors and lead them to believe that
a property owner is an insurer for any business invitee
injured on his premises, contrary to the actual law.
B.

Assumption
defense in
refusal to
materially

of the risk is still a viable
Utah and the trial court's
submit the defense to the jury
prejudiced defendant's case.

At the close of the evidence defendant also submitted
a proposed Special Verdict containing an interrogatory
on assumption of the risk and proposed the following
instructions:
INSTRUCTION NO. 11
There is a legal principal [sic] commonly
referred to by the term "assumption of risk"
which is as follows:
·
One is said to assume a risk
when h e voluna·
.
· assent to. a d ange rous tcondanger
itarily manifests
his
tion and voluntarily exposes h~mself to ~har care
when he knows, or in the exercise of ordinadytion
would know, that a danger exists in the con 1
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of the equipm:nt or premises and uses the equipment and premises and voluntarily places himself
or remains, within the position of danger.
INSTRUCTION NO. 12
Before the doctrine of assumption of risk
is applicable, you must find:
(1) the person in
question must have actual knowledge of the danger,
or the conditions must be such that he would have
such knowledge if he exercised ordinary care, (2)
he must have freedom of choice. This freedom of
choice must have come from circumstances that
provide him a reasonable opportunity, without
violating any legal or moral duty to safely refuse
to expose himself to the danger in question.
INSTRUCTION NO. 13
In considering whether Mr. Moore voluntarily
assented to or assumed a risk so as to subject
himself to the doctrine assumption of risk, you
may consider his age, experience and capacity
along with all other surrounding circumstances
shown by the evidence in determining what he
knew and what he should have appreciated about
the risk involved.
[R.

408-10].
The trial court refused defendant's proposed interroga-

tory and did not instruct the jury as to assumption of risk,
even though plaintiff also submitted proposed instructions
on the issue.

The court's rationale for its ruling was:

I [the court] think it is a negligence case, is
what it is, a comparative negligence case. I
think the instructions ought to be limited to
that, excluding assumption of the risk which,
under comparative negligence, is part of comparative [sic] negligence.
[R. 899, lines 20-24].
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Defendant submits that both the court's ruling
saning are in error.

and rea·

Whil econ t r1·b u t ory negligencehasbeer

swallowed up within the ambit of comparative negligence,
assumption of the risk remains a complete defense when
properly plead.
Assumption of the risk and contributory negligence have
long been recognized in this jurisdiction as distinctly
separate defenses.

Kuchenmeister v. Los Angeles and S.L.R.

Co., 52 Utah 116, 172 P.725 (1918).

However, just as an

accident can give rise to recovery theories based

u~n

negligence, warranty, and contract depending upon what the
jury decides the facts actually were, so may such an accident have factual bases which sustain the defenses of both
assumption of risk and contributory negligence, thereby
creating an area of overlapping defense.
Many courts have been unable to distinguish between tr.:
two concepts in these overlapping situations, resulting in
much confusion.

To a large extent the problem has been

caused by loose usage of the term "assumption of the risk,"
for the term covers two concepts.

Harper and James explair.

the difference as follows:
(1) In its primary sense, the plaintiff's
assumption of risk is the counterpart of th7 'ff
defendant's lack of duty to protect the plaint.
from the risk, and plaintiff may not recover ~or
his injury, although he was quite reasonable in
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encountering it.
(2) In its secondary sense, a
plaintiff may be said to assume a risk created by
def7ndant's breach of duty towards him, when he
deliberately chooses to encounter that risk. In
such a case, plaintiff will be barred from recovery o~ly if he was u~reasonable in encountering
the risk under the circumstances. This is a form
of contributory negligence.
Harper and James, The Law of Torts, S21.1, page 1162
(1956) [cited in Calahan v. Wood, 465 P.2d 169, 172 (Utah
1970) l .
As stated, assumption of the risk in its primary sense
is the counterpart of the defendant's lack of duty to pro-

tect plaintiff.

Contributory negligence, on the other hand,

is a matter of some fault or departure from the standard of

conduct of the reasonable man however unaware, unwilling, or
even protesting the plaintiff may be.

Of course there will

be many situations where the two doctrines intersect or
overlap.
Obviously the two may co-exist when the plaintiff
makes an unreasonable choice to incur the risk;
but either may exist without the other. The
significant difference, when there is one, is
likely to be one between risks which were in fact
known to the plaintiff, and risks which he merely
might have discovered by the exercise of ordinary
care.
Prosser, The Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) at 441.
The distinction between the two defenses, as delineated
by

Professor Prosser, has long been established in this

jurisdiction.

As early as 1918, the Utah Supreme Court
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noted the potential overlap of the defenses and the

need for
distinguishing them in Kuchenmeister v. Los A ngeles a2!9_
S.L.R. Co., 52 Utah 116, 172 P.725 (1918).

Citing with

approval the early English common law decision of Thomas v.
Quartermain, L.R. 18, Q.B.Div., the court wrote:
But the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria
[assumed risk) stands outside the defense of
contributory negligence and is in no way limited
by it.
In individual instances, the two ideas
sometimes seem to cover the same ground, but
carelessness is not the same thing as intelligent
choice.

* * *
It needs no argument, therefore, to demonstrate
that while in a particular case facts may be such
as to justify a finding of both contributory
negligence and assumption of risk, yet contributory
negligence does not necessarily arise from intelligent choice, and therefore is not necessarily
included in assumption of risk.
Id. at 729 (italics omitted).
The distinction continued.

In Clay v. Dunford,

121 Utah 177, 239 P.2d 1075, 1077 (1952), the court noted
the correctness of the converse of the proposition:
Furthermore, plaintiffs' failure to exercise
ordinary care to discover the danger is not
properly a matter of assumption of risk, but of
the defense of contributory negligence.
Yet however clear the distinction may appear in theory
. app 1.ica t ion.
.
it has been muddie d in

For many people the

•
·
· k" was much easier to concepbuzzword 'assumption
o f ris
· th e abstract than would be the
tualize and un d erstan d in

-22-
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dichotomy of lack of duty and unreasonable response.

And,

since assumption of risk and contributory negligence both
operated as complete bars to a plaintiff's recovery, there
was no pressing need to adequately distinguish between the
theories.

Hence the loose application of the term continued

with predictable results.

Some cases found the plaintiff to

have assumed the risk when he failed to use reasonable care
to discover the danger.

In others, a faulty assumption of

risk defense still was found sufficient to comprise contributory negligence and therefore bar recovery.

In short, one

man's assumption of risk became another's contributory
negligence.

The results were, understandably, confused and

oftentimes irreconcilable.
It was upon this backdrop that the Utah legislature
authored the Utah Comparative

Neg~igence

Act.

Apparently

distraught with not only the injustices wrought by the Contributory Negligence Doctrine, but also with the chameleonlike manner in which assumption of risk became contributory
negligence in many of the overlap cases, the Utah Legislature attempted to remedy the confusion.

By doing so, it

engendered more confusion.
The Utah Comparative Negligence Statute reads:
Contributory negligence shall not.bar recovery in an action by any person or his 17gal
representative to recover damages for negl~g7nce
or gross negligence resulting in death or inJury
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to person or property, if such negligence wa
not as great as the negligence or gross negl~
gence of the person against whom recovery is
~ought~ but any damages allowed shall be diminished in t~e proportion to the amount of negligence at~r1bu~able to the person recovering.
~s used in this act, "contributory negligence"
includes "assumption of risk".
Section 78-27-37, Utah Code Ann.

(1953)

(as amended 1973),

The question now arises whether the legislature intended
to totally abolish assumption of the risk as a defense
in this jurisdiction, or only to the extent that it tracks
comparative negligence.

The statute itself is susceptible

of either interpretation.
Plaintiff argues that the statutory language is clear.
And, in order to give each word meaning, assumption of the
risk (as used in the statute) must be held to include prima::
assumption of risk since secondary assumption of the risk

ha

always been equated with contributory negligence and would
fall within the statutory ambit even without the specific
statutory inclusion of assumption of the risk.
Plaintiff's reasoning is in error.

[R. 545-4 61·

The language in

question is operative even without including primary assumption of the risk.

A proper reading of the statute shows a

legislative intent to clarify the lawmakers' position as to
a muddied area of the law and to prohibit any poten

t 1. al enc

runs around the import of the statute by disguising contnt:
tory negligence arguments under the guise of as sump

-24-
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t 1·0 n of

the risk as has been done in the past.

Therefore, when

given the reading contended for by defendant, the language
in question is not mere surplusage as plaintiff contends
but is an important clarification of legislative purpose.
Plaintiff's literal reading of the statute, on the
other hand, leads to an incongruous result which defendant
contends was clearly not intended by the Utah Legislature.
In its primary sense, assumption of the risk is a distinct
method for showing a lack of duty on defendant's part to
protect plaintiff because of plaintiff's own actions.

If

comparative negligence is now read to encompass primary
assumption of the risk then the basic element of any
negligence action--breach of a legally recognizable duty--is
now made a mere factor in apportioning negligence, rather
than in deciding whether or not negligent activity actually
exists.

Defendant believes plaintiff should not urge that the

statute be read to produce such a ludicrous and certainly
unintended result.
Such incongruity results, however, when attempts are
made to give statutes universal and literal application.
When it is obvious such result was not intended, the statute
should not be so applied.

Snyder v. Clune, 15 U. 2d 254,

39 P.2d 915 (1964).
Instead, "where there is ambiguity or uncertainty in a
portion of a statute, it is proper to look to the entire act
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in order to discern its meaning and

1· n t

en t ; and if it is

reasonably susceptible of different interpretations

'

the

one

should be chosen which best harmonizes with its general
Purpose ".

Gran t v. Ut a h St ate Land Board, 26 u. 2d 100,

485 P.2d 1035, 1037 (1971).

The oft stated general purpose behind Utah's Comparative Negligence Act is to eliminate the former harsh and
often times unjust workings of the doctrine of contributory
negligence.

To the extent that assumption of the risk does

nothing more than tract contributory negligence principles,
it must surely be included within the act's coverage.

How-

ever, the purpose of the Utah Comparative Negligence Act was
clearly not to abrogate the defense that no duty was owed to
a plaintiff in a situation where the plaintiff was aware of
the risk of injury and voluntarily undertook to assume such
risk.

This was clearly not the purpose and legislative

intent behind the Comparative Negligence Act, despite
plaintiff's insistence to the contrary.

While the subject

matter area is quite complex, the legislature is presumed to
understand the area of law within which it legislates and
thus to use terms knowledgeably and advisedly.

Greenha19.!!

· al so presumec
v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975); it is
to intend that the statutes it promulgates will be given a
reasonable and sensible construction and not one which
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results in absurd consequences.

Curtis v. Harmon Electronics

0£;.• 575 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1978).

Defendant's position is also supported in the case law.
The Utah Supreme Court, recognizing the different concepts
of the term "assumption of the risk" has specifically stated
that the use of assumption of the risk in some cases amounts
in substance to nothing different from a defense of contributory negligence, but that in other cases, the defense is
entirely separate and distinct from contributory negligence.
The controlling case in this area is Rigtrup v. Strawberry
Water Users Assoc., 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1977).

In this case,

plaintiff-appellant Rigtrup contended on appeal that the
trial court had erred by instructing the jury as to assumption of risk after it had adequately instructed on contributory negligence.

In affirming the trial court's action, the

Supreme Court stated:
Though there have been some differences in
view as to the defense of assumption of risk in
its relation to other aspects of contributory
negligence, it has since time immemorial been regarded as a valid defense in the law of this state.
It has sometimes been said to be but a specialized
aspect of contributory negligence in that it can·
be intermingled and confused with othe: aspects
thereof in certain circumstances. It is also
sometimes said to be something separate from
contributory negligence, as it undoubtedly can be
in some circumstances.
Id. at 1250.
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The Rigtrup case clearly holds that assumption of risk
is still a viable defense in this jurisdiction.

The issue

then becomes whether the defense operates as a complete bar
to a plaintiff's recovery or whether its component elements
are to be weighed in the computation of comparative fault
along with the component elements previously giving rise to
a contributory negligence defense.

While some dicta in the

opinion suggests that the latter is the rule, case holdings
suggest the former is correct.

The Supreme Court held that

the trial court in Rigtrup acted properly in issuing the
assumption of risk instructions.
491-46]

Those instructions [R.

establish assumption of risk as a complete bar to

recovery in a negligence action where a plaintiff voluntarily
assumes the risk of a known danger.
This construction of the Utah Comparative Negligence
Act finds further support in Becker v. Beaverton School
District No. 48, 551 P.2d 498 (Or.App. 1976).

In~,

the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the Oregon Comparative
Negligence Statute did ot bar the defense of assumption of
risk absolutely.

The court stated:

We hold that the . • . comparative negligence statute • . • applied only to assumptio~
of the risk in its secondary sense. The wording
of this statute suggests this. As noted above,
the statute provided:
"Contributory negligence, including
assumption of the risk, shall not bar
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recovery in an action • • • if such
negligence contributing to the injury
was not as great as the negligence of
the person against whom recovery is
sought • •
" ORS. 18.470 (1973).
The choice of the term "such negligence" in
the second clause of the statute required the
term "contributory negligence" or its equivalent
as an antecedent. Therefore, we conclude that
the phrase "including assumption of the risk"
was merely used as synonym for "contributory
negligence," the words immediately preceding the
phrase. See V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence,
160, §9.2, (1974). Since the statute did not
apply to assumption of the risk in its primary
sense and since the defendant pleaded assumption
of the risk in that sense, it would not have been
proper for the trial court to give plaintiff's
requested instructions on comparative negligence.
Under ORS. 18.470 (1973), assumption of the risk
in its primary sense remained a complete bar to
a negligence action.
Becker v. Beaverton School Dist. No. 48, supra, at 502.
The reasoning of Becker applies just as readily in
Utah. Utah's Comparative Negligence Statute differs from the
Oregon statute only in that the inclusion of assumption of
the risk within the term "contributory negligence" is stated
in a separate sentence rather than in a clause.

Otherwise

the language is identical.
The Oregon statute has since been amended.
flatly declares:

It now

"The doctrine of implied assumption of the

risk is abolished."

Or. Rev. Stat. §18.475(2).

As pointed out in Thompson v. Weaver, 560 P.2d 620,
623 (Or. 1977), the new statute abolishes assumption of the
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cq

risk as a basis for barring- recovery.
felled the doctrine in toto.

Th e

oregon

legislaturi

However, the passage of the

amendment itself would seem to indicate that the legisl~u"
recognized that the pre-amendment statute did not

aboli~

assumption of the risk except as it overlapped contributory
negligence, in accord with the reasoning of Becker.
The Becker-Thompson constructions of the Oregon
Comparative Negligence Statute are clearly analogous to the
case at hand.

The court in Rigtrup recognized that an in-

struction stating that assumption of the risk in its proper
sense may still act as a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery is proper.

The reasoning in Becker suggests that

Utah's Comparative Negligence Act is as reasonably susceptible to differing interpretations as was Oregon's.

While

a change in Utah law may, arguendo, be beneficial, such
change is to be brought about legislatively, as in the Oregon situation, and not judicially.

This fact was properly

recognized by the Rigtrup court.
[W]e decline the invitation to so change our
law. One of the important values in our system which tends to produce confidence in and
respect for the law is that the law as it is
declared and known has sufficient solidarity
and continuity that it can be relied on with
assurance. We think that those objectives are
best served by the judicial branch refraining
from legislating any abrupt or dramatic changes of a substantial nature in the law and ~y
leaving any such changes therein to t~e l~gi7lature, whose constitutional prerogative it is.
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~gtrup

v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n., 563 P.2d 1247, 1250

(Utah 1977) •
Until the Utah legislature chooses to abolish the
defense of the assumption of risk as a complete bar in a
negligence action, it should be maintained and upheld by
the state trial courts.

The doctrine is not a confusing

duplication of contributory negligence where properly
analyzed, but is a separate and distinct legal concept.

As

Prosser states:
Where the plaintiff acts unreasonably in
making his choice, it is said that their [sic]
is merely one form of contributory negligence
which is certainly true; and from this it is
argued that there is, or should be no distinction between the two defenses and that there
is only useless and confusing duplication.
But this is a distinctive kind of contributory
negligence, in which the plaintiff knows the
risk and voluntarily accepts it; and it has
been held to differ from contributory negligence which merely fails to discover the danger
in several minor respects. Thus assumption of
risk is governed by the subjective standard of
the plaintiff himself, whereas contributory
negligence is measured by the objective standard of the reasonable man.
Prosser, The Law of Torts, (4th ed. 1971) at 456.
Assumption of risk in its primary sense is still a
viable defense in this jurisdiction.

Therefore, as shown

supra at page fourteen, if there was credible evidence from which
a jury might draw an inference that the plaintiff assumed the
risk of injury, the trial court committed prejudicial error
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in denying defendant its instructions and special verdict
interrogatory on the subject.
In order to ascertain whether or not the record contains evidence supporting an application of the doctrine in
this case, it is necessary to understand the doctrine's requirements.

To be barred from recovery, plaintiff must

encounter the risk knowingly and voluntarily, Johnson v,
Maynard, 9 U.2d 268, 342 P.2d 884 (1959); he must look, see,
and know the danger.

Clay v. Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 239

P.2d 1075 (1952).
The standard to be applied is, in theory at least,
subjective.

However, our experience with the criminal branch

of law has demonstrated the propensity for injustice which
results where a plaintiff can absolve himself from fault by
testifying to his own lack of knowledge.

Consequently, ele-

ments of knowledge and intent are usually proven through cir·
cumstantial evidence.
law,

A similar process has evolved in tort

injecting an objective element into assumption of risk.

A plaintiff

is not to be believed when he asserts that he

didn't comprehend a risk which is obvious.

Prosser,~

of Torts, page 448 (4th ed. 1971 ); Renner v. Kinn~, 373 p,ld
668 (Ore. 1962).
In his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for a New Trial, plaintiff focuses his analysis on the

-32-
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assumption of risk requirement that before one can assume a
risk he must be aware of the specific danger involved.
[R. 548), Foster v. Steed, 23 U.2d 148, 459 P.2d 1021
(1969); McGrath v. Wallace Murray Corp., 496 F.2d 299 (10th

Cir. 1974).

Generally speaking, this is a proper principle.

certainly one who senses the potential bruises and broken
bones attending contact football does not, by his participation in the game, consent to be stabbed by an opponent; that
is outside the risk contemplated by the rules.
Plaintiff knew the rules attending the use of this
piece of dangerous equipment.
injure him.

[R.

761).

[R. 761, 779, 788).

He knew its condition could

He didn't ask for instructions.

Lack of certain machine guards was said

to cause the injury [R. 621) yet their absence was obvious.
Use of the rotatable hood guard would have prevented the
injury, and expert testimony said the guard's use was
standard operating procedure.

[R. 951-52).

Plaintiff knew

the hood would rotate, yet he made no attempt to use the
guard, blaming his failure on a yardman's failure to rotate
the guard for him.

(R.

man to adjust the hood.

789); yet, he never asked the yard[R.

789).

Defendant admits that, upon the evidence, a jury may
find that Mr. Moore did not assume the risk of his injuries.
On the other hand, it may so find.

The fact in issue is
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that the lower court's belief that assumption of the risk
had been swallowed up into comparative negligence denied the
defendant the opportunity of having the defense even consid·
ered.

There was, at the least, a fact question for t he jury,
If the evidence shows that the plaintiff
was aware of facts which might have put him on
notice of a hazard, but falls short of establishing an obvious danger of which he must have been
aware, a question of fact for the jury may nevertheless be presented as to whether the plaintiff
had a conscious awareness and appreciation of the
inherent dangers he choose to encounter.

57 Am. Jur. 2d., 676, Negligence, §282.
The two principles discussed above--lack of duty and
assumption of risk--are very similar in nature and effect,
yet have been applied differently in concept.

Defendant sub·

mited instructions on both theories to the court, not knowin~
how the court would choose to characterize the defense.

~e

court's failure to issue the assumption of risk instruction
only compounded its mistake in failing to properly instruct
the jury on the duty owing an invitee.

The result was to

completely strip the defendant of a defense to which it wu
entitled.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT INSTRUCTING
THE JURY THAT PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGENCE IN
NOT USING THE HOOD GUARD AND KEEPING HIS
HANDS OUT OF THE CUT LINE WAS A PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES.
.

1 intiff

The Special Verdict returned by the Jury found Pa

th' 1

negligent.

There is a great deal of factual support for
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'·

finding.

It is certainly prima facie negligence for a person

to undertake to operate a dangerous piece of machinery, in
this case a radial arm saw, without using a guard provided
for and attached to the saw.

Further, expert testimony indi-

cated it is a cardinal rule of safety that while using such
a machine, an operators hands should never be within the cutting area of the saw and the operator's eyes should always be
on the cutting blade while it is in motion.

[R. 952].

In light of such evidence, defendant proposed that the
jury be instructed to answer "Yes" to the special interrogatory asking whether plaintiff was negligent and whether
plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause of his own injury.

[R. 398].

The court refused the proposed instruction

and defendant took exception.

[R. 1028].

Defendant submits that the court erred in failing to
give the instruction since upon the facts herein, plaintiff's action was, as a matter of law, a proximate cause of
the injury and, indeed, could be found to be, as a matter of
law, the sole proximate cause of his injury.
Proximate cause has been defined as the
cause next in relation to cause and effect.
That which in natural sequence, unbroken by
any efficient, intervening cause produces the
injury, without which the result would not
have occurred. That which is nearest in the
order of causation. The last negligent act
~ontributory to an injury without which ~uch
injury would not have resulted. The dom~nant
cause, the moving or producing cause, this
cause must be an act or omission.
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Toma v. Utah Power and Light Co., 12

u.

2d 278, 365 P. 2a

788, 794 (1961)(emphasis added).
There can be no doubt that plaintiff's actions fall
within the ambit of this definition.

Even if we assume,

arguendo, the defendant breached a duty owed plaintiff by
failing to warn plaintiff of the danger posed by the circu·
lar saw, the accident and resulting injury could not have
occurred if plaintiff had either:

( 1) made use of the hood

guard, or ( 2) kept his hand out of the line of the cut.
Plaintiff's placing his hand in the line of the cut is cer·
tainly the nearest act in the order of causation.
The lower court's error was compounded by the fact that,
upon the evidence, the court could easily have instructed the
jury that not only was plaintiff's conduct a proximate CGH
of his injury, but, as a matter of law, his actions constitute the sole proximate cause of his injury.
The rationale for finding that plaintiff's actions constitute the sole proximate cause of his injury is that his
negligence occurred later in time.

However, defendant

realizes that the mere fact that one actor's negligence
.

postdates another actor's negligence does not automat1ca
relieve the first of liability.

lly .

Velasquez v. Greyhound

Lines, Inc., 12 U. 2d 379, 366 P.2d 9 8 9 (1961) ·

"Butthis

.
.
· f t on curring
is true only if both negligent acts are in ac c
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I

proximate causes of the injury; and it is not true if the
later negligence is an independent, intervening sole proximate cause of the incident."

Id. at 991; Toma v. Utah Power

and Light Co., 12 U. 2d 278, 365 P.2d 788, 794 (1961).
The distinction then is one of concurring cause versus
independent intervening cause.
[T]his is the test to be applied; did the wrongful act, in a natural and continuous sequence
of events which might reasonably be expected to
follow, produce the injury? If so, it could be
said to be a concurring proximate cause of the
injury even though the later negligent act of
another * * * cooperated to cause it. On the
other hand, if the latter's act of negligence
* * * was of such character as not reasonably
to be expected to happen in the natural sequence
of events, then such later act of negligence is
the independent, intervening cause and therefore
the sole proximate cause of the injury.
Velasquez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra at 992.
It is certainly not "reasonably expected" that an experienced wood-worker would not only fail to use the standard
hood guard on a dangerous circular saw but, in addition, will run
his hands across the cut line of the rotating blade.

In line

with the afore-cited authorities, plaintiff's actions were
the sole proximate cause of his injury and the trial court
erred to defendant's prejudice in not so instructing the jury.
CONCLUSION
The errors of law committed by the lower court cannot
be brushed aside as being harmless.
tial and damaging.

They are both substan-

The court's failure to instruct the jury
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G

that there is no duty to warn a business invitee 1·n the face
of an obvious danger, while so instructing as to the duty
owed a licensee, resulted in confusion of issues and allowed
the jury to find the defendant negligent for breach of a
duty not recognized by law.
The court's failure to instruct the jury as to assumption of the risk, based on the court's opinion that assumption of risk has been engulfed by comparative negligence,
worked to deprive the defendant of a defense still recognizeo
in Utah law, which i f decided in defendant's favor, would
have operated as a complete bar to plaintiff's action.
In instructing the jury on proximate cause, the lower
court acted contrary to law and pol icy.

Under principles

of Utah law, plaintiff's negligence was a proximate cause
(and possibly the sole proximate cause) of his injury.

~e

court's denial of defendant's proposed instruction deprived
defendant of a verdict to which it was entitled upon the
applicable law and facts.
Taken as a whole, the lower court's mistakes of law are
not merely harm 1 ess error.

The Cumulatl·ve effect was to de·

prive defendant of its theory of the case by removing de. 1 e d b Y 1 aw.
fenses to which defendant was ent1t

The result
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was to deny defendant a fair trial of the issues.

Justice

demands that these errors be corrected.
Respectfully submitted,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By

Ra~B-;rrf)., ·~

By_s:i:3.::P-C<~;;~ '2-l.Bruce H. Jensen,
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant Burton Lumber &
Hardware Company
700 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 521-9000
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